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1. Introduction 
 
Whether raising school expenditure is an effective way to improve educational outcomes is a 
contentious issue. Hanushek (2008) argues that accumulated research says that there is 
currently no clear, systematic relationship between resources and student outcomes, with the 
implication that conventional input policies are unlikely to improve achievement. However, a 
critique of this argument would point to a number of high quality studies that suggest 
otherwise.
2
 Well-known examples include the paper on class size in Israel (Angrist and Lavy, 
1999) and the experimental Tennessee STAR class size reduction papers (Krueger, 1999; 
Krueger and Whitmore, 2001). A difficulty with this debate is that studies with an excellent 
methodological design are rare and data available to researchers usually falls well short of the 
ideal. Thus, it is not clear how far one can use the literature to give policy advice on whether 
or not governments should raise the amount of money they spend on school education.  
 In the UK, education is the third largest area of government spending (of which 
school spending has the largest share). Since 2000, school expenditure has increased by about 
40 per cent in real terms for both primary and secondary schools (see Figure 1).
3
 The 
question as to whether such investment is worthwhile is of central importance. The national 
debate is not revealing as to the answer. The government points to the improvement in the 
number of students achieving government targets in national tests whereas critics argue that 
this simply represents „grade-inflation‟ and „teaching to the test‟.  
                                                          
2
 The two sides to the argument are discussed in detail by Hanushek (2003) and Krueger (2003). For earlier 
reviews of the literature, see Hanushek (1986; 1997). 
3
 Government statistics show a decline in the pupil-teacher ratio over time. Currently, 88 per cent of primary 
pupils are taught in a class of no more than 30 pupils compared to 78 per cent in 2000.  
http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/trends/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.showIndicator&cid=3&iid=15 
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 In this paper, we address this issue for English primary schools. We use census data 
available on all pupils completing state primary schools between 2001/02 and 2006/07.
4
 This 
includes measures of academic achievement on national (externally marked) tests of English, 
Mathematics and Science at age 11 (our outcome measures); similar measures of prior 
attainment (on the basis of tests at age 7); and indicators of gender, ethnicity and socio-
economic deprivation. The data set can be linked to the school-level census for relevant 
years, which includes school expenditure. Thus, a unique feature of our data set is that it 
contains detailed information on school-level expenditure, for all English state primary 
schools, over a time period of eight years. Since we have a panel of schools, it is possible to 
remove the effect of time-invariant, unobserved school characteristics that potentially affect 
both expenditure and pupil achievement in tests. The fact that the data set is a pupil-level 
administrative data set, representing a census of English school children over a number of 
years, and containing measures of current and prior academic achievement (as measured in 
national tests that are external to the school), as well as unique expenditure data, makes this a 
much better data set than what is typically available to researchers who have analyzed this 
question. This matters because we are able to overcome methodological difficulties without 
the need for a sophisticated experiment (which unfortunately is not available to us) and are 
able to address the issue as to whether increases in pupil expenditure matter on average for 
the population (Instrumental Variable estimates identify an effect only for the sub-population 
that is affected by the instrument). 
 Much of the focus of the literature has been on the pupil-teacher ratio as a measure of 
school resources. While this is the main school input (in terms of cost), we would like to 
highlight the fact that using direct expenditure per pupil is a more general approach, allowing 
                                                          
4
 Only a minority of children attend private schools in the UK, and it is especially uncommon for the years of 
primary schooling.  
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the estimate to reflect expenditure effects through channels other than class size, such as 
teacher quality. Although this approach does not open up the „black box‟ of school 
expenditure mechanisms, it is in fact highly policy relevant, since the policy-maker cannot 
always prescribe what schools do with their money, but has a greater role in determining the 
level of resources passed on to schools. Thus, from the policy-maker‟s perspective, the 
„reduced-form‟ effect of increasing school resources is highly relevant, and also gives an idea 
of whether schools are able to translate spending increases to improvements in educational 
output. 
In the literature about the effects of school resources, one of the main difficulties has 
been that there is a strong redistributive component in how resources are allocated to schools 
(at least in the UK and the US). If this is not taken into account, there is a high risk of 
downward bias in the estimate of the effect of school resources on academic achievement. 
This is one argument for why so many studies find no apparent effect of resources on 
achievement. We show that by controlling for the range of pupil and school-level 
characteristics available to us (and taking out the school fixed effect), the sign of the 
estimated effect of school resources on pupil achievement changes from negative to positive 
(and is statistically significant). Moreover, this effect is of a similar magnitude for all three 
subjects (English, Mathematics and Science) and corresponds to about 5 per cent of a 
standard deviation. We are able to identify effects after including so many controls because 
of the complicated system of funding schools. The system has many idiosyncrasies at the 
local level, and the sharp increase in school spending since 2000 has also been accompanied 
by numerous changes at the national level. The changes over time implied by government 
regulations are thus exogenous to decisions made at school level. 
Although we are not able to prove our identifying assumption (that the error term is 
randomly distributed), we apply a simple falsification test, where we show results which 
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support our argument that the positive effect of expenditure on achievement represents a 
causal impact. Specifically, we find that a positive effect of expenditure on achievement only 
occurs if the spending has taken place during the pupil‟s time in primary school; it has no 
effect if it takes place the year after the pupil has left their primary school (and entered 
secondary school). This finding is convincing and suggests that the estimated positive effects 
of school expenditure are not driven by an unobservable factor. If one accepts the assumption 
of our analysis, then it is legitimate to interact average expenditure with pupil-level 
characteristics and consider whether there might be heterogeneity in the effects of 
expenditure. We find that expenditure has had a higher impact for pupils who are more 
economically disadvantaged, but there seems to be little heterogeneity in expenditure effects 
based on pupils‟ ability or whether they speak English as a second language. 
Our paper has the following sections. In Section 2, we describe relevant features of 
the English system of education. In Section 3, we describe our data. In Section 4, we outline 
the methodology and report our results. We conclude in Section 5.  
 
2. The English System of Education and Funding to Schools 
The years of compulsory schooling in England are organized into various „Key Stages‟. At 
the end of each Key Stage (at the age of 7, 11, 14, and 16), there is a national test that is 
marked externally to the school. The results at the end of primary school (i.e. the end of Key 
Stage 2, at age 11) and secondary school (the end of Key Stage 4, at age 16) are especially 
important because they are published in the School Performance Tables, which are publicly 
available. At age 7 pupils take national tests in Mathematics and English; at age 11 and 14, 
national tests cover Mathematics, English and Science; and at age 16, the national tests are 
taken in a wide range of subjects. In this paper, results in the tests at the end of primary 
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school are used as our outcome variables. We use the results of the earlier (age 7) test as a 
proxy for prior ability/human capital.  
There are about 13,000 primary schools in England and most of their funding goes 
through Local Authorities (of which there are 150).
5
 During the time period covered in this 
study, about 75-80 per cent of Local Authority education resources came from central 
government, while most of the rest was financed by local taxation. Once the funding gets to 
schools, the decision about how to spend it is up to the headteacher and governing body 
(although they are constrained by national pay agreements in the extent to which they can 
increase teacher salaries). Appendix Table 1 shows different categories of expenditure. 
Although expenditure levels have increased dramatically, the way in which it is spent (at least 
in terms of these broad categories) has not changed much over time.
6
 About 60 per cent of 
expenditure is accounted for by teachers and a further 20 per cent by either support staff or 
other staff. Building and Maintenance accounts for about 6 per cent; Learning resources/IT 
for about 5 per cent; and a residual category for 8 per cent.  
Funding is allocated from central government to Local Authorities mostly on the basis 
of pupil numbers, measures of deprivation, ethnicity and area costs. The Local Authorities 
distribute funding to schools based on formulae, which vary between Local Authorities. The 
existence of formula funding means that there is horizontal equity within each Local 
Authority as all schools are funded by the same set of rules (Levăcić, 2008). However, there 
is considerable heterogeneity between Local Authorities in the formula used.
7
 For example, 
                                                          
5
 They are also responsible for the strategic management of local authority education services including 
planning the supply of school places, ensuring every child has access to a suitable school place and intervening 
where a school is failing its pupils. 
6
 Government statistics show a decline in the pupil-teacher ratio over time. Currently, 88 per cent of primary 
pupils are taught in a class of no more than 30 pupils compared to 78 per cent in 2000.  
http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/trends/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.showIndicator&cid=3&iid=15 
7
 The formula used by Local Authorities must take into account pupil numbers. The remainder of the formula 
may include factors from a „menu‟ set out in regulations, including special educational needs, pupils for whom 
English is not their first language, pupil mobility, characteristics of the school buildings and site, use of energy 
by schools, salaries at a school, incidence of pupils from ethnic minority groups having below average levels of 
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this was revealed with respect to the proportion of funding passed on to schools on the basis 
of deprivation (according to information collected for a subset of Local Authorities in 
2004/05, DfES/HM Treasury, 2005). Findings include the following: “there is a wide degree 
of variation between local authorities‟ strategies for assessing and funding the costs of 
deprivation, and there has often been no systematic approach to reviewing need.”; “schools 
facing the same scale of deprivation in different authorities often receive different amounts of 
funding from their authorities to deal with deprivation.” To illustrate that there is much 
school-level variation in the amount of per pupil expenditure (even for a given level of 
deprivation), in Figure 2 we show a plot of the distribution of per pupil expenditure for two 
years (2002 and 2007) within each category of socio-economic deprivation (measured in 
quartiles and based on the school‟s percentage of pupil eligible to receive Free School 
Meals). Points to note are that within each quartile, there is a distribution of expenditure per 
pupil and that this has widened over time; also, there are schools in the highest quartile of 
deprivation that have the same amount of expenditure per pupil as schools in the lowest 
quartile. Thus, across Local Authorities, there is much variation in school resources, even 
after accounting for major determinants of resource allocation such as pupil numbers and an 
indicator of deprivation.  
During the time period that we focus on, 2002-2007, there have been changes both in 
how funding is allocated from central government to Local Authorities, and in regulations 
about how Local Authorities pass on funding to schools. A major change in how central 
government allocated funding to Local Authorities took place in 2003/04. This involved a 
change in the funding formula at the national level and the indicators used to measure 
„additional educational needs‟ (see West, 2008). The part of the formula that deals with area 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
academic achievement in relation to other pupils in the local authority area, prior attainment of pupils entering a 
school (West, 2008). 
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costs has also changed over time. Since 2006/07, the funding allocated to Local Authorities 
has been „ring-fenced‟ (i.e. they are obliged to pass it all on to schools, whereas previously 
they could spend part of the education budget on other services).   
At the local level, changes that affect how Local Authorities pass on funding to 
schools include changes in the percentage of funding that must be „pupil-led‟8; an obligation 
(from 2002/03) to include a factor in their formulae based on the incidence of social 
deprivation in their schools; and a „minimum funding guarantee‟ in 2004/05 which 
guaranteed that each school would get a per pupil increase and an increase for fixed costs.   
This description shows that in recent years there has been much (regulatory-inspired) 
change in how funding is allocated to schools. Unfortunately, we do not have information 
about how Local Authorities have changed their own funding formulae over time. But we 
know enough to say that the formulae are heterogeneous and thus change over time has 
varied between different Local Authorities and schools. Conditional on a broad set of 
controls, it is therefore likely that changes over time are idiosyncratic (such as how 
deprivation is measured at the local level)
 9
 as well as influenced by changing regulations. 
Thus, there is good reason to argue that there is exogenous variation in school expenditure 
which is left after one conditions on school and pupil characteristics. Unfortunately, it has not 
been possible to use any of these changes individually as the basis of an Instrumental 
Variable Strategy.
10
 
                                                          
8
 „Pupil-led‟ means funding that has the same value for pupils of a certain age regardless of school attended. 
This change from 80 per cent to 75 per cent in 2002/03. It was abolished as a rule in 2006/07. 
9
 The indicators of „additional need‟ in the national formula changed in 2003/04 (i.e. the formula determining 
the allocation of funding from central government to Local Authorities). These measures were higher quality 
than before as a result of pupil-level administrative data being collected by individual schools from 2002 
onwards (West, 2008). The availability of higher quality data may also have influenced Local Authorities to 
change the basis of their individual formulae. 
10
 Holmlund et al. (2008) report on various possible strategies. However, these have not produced a strong 
enough „first stage‟ to be used as part of an IV strategy. Furthermore, we do not have information on the 
formulae used by Local Authorities to allocate funding to schools (other than a survey of 38 LAs conducted in 
2004/05). Finally, although the 2003/04 national change in funding formulae might seem to offer a good 
opportunity to construct an index of „winner‟ and „loser‟ Local Authorities, in practice the government 
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3. Data and Methodology 
We use the National Pupil Database between 2001/02 and 2006/07 which is a census of all 
pupils in State schools.
11
 We use information on the test scores of 11 year olds (i.e. at the end 
of Key Stage 2), which has been matched to their attainment at age 7 (i.e. at the end of Key 
Stage 1) and is also linked to information on pupil characteristics which include the 
following: gender, ethnicity; whether the pupil is known to be eligible for Free School Meals; 
whether English is his/her first language; whether he/she has a statement of Special 
Educational Needs or has Special Educational Needs without a statement. The data can be 
linked to school-level information in the Annual School Census (such as pupil numbers; 
pupil-teacher ratio; percentage of pupils known to be eligible for Free School Meals) and 
financial data on schools. Expenditure per pupil is used as the measure of school resources 
and in our main regressions, we use average expenditure over the last three years leading up 
to the Key Stage 2 assessment, to account for the fact that it is school expenditure for a 
number of years that matters for outcomes rather than expenditure in one year.
12
 Summary 
statistics for the pupil level data set are shown in Appendix Table 2.  
 We estimate an Educational Production Function, which can be described as follows:  
 
Aist = α0 + βEst  + γXist + δZst + αt + µs + εist                                 (1) 
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
deliberately mitigated the effects of the formulae change to Local Authorities (in a strategy known as 
„dampening‟). 
11
 We exclude students in Special schools from the analysis – and any students attending independent schools 
(although many such students would either not be in the data at all or only have incomplete information). 
12
 The expenditure measure is expressed in 2007 prices, deflated using the GDP deflator. Our results are 
qualitatively similar if we use the pupil-teacher ratio as the measure of school resources. However, this is more 
problematic as a measure because in many primary schools, children are grouped by ability for certain subjects 
(especially Maths) in the final years of primary school. We only observe the pupil-teacher ratio for the year 
group and not for the class in which the pupil has spent most of his/her time. Furthermore, expenditure per pupil 
is a more general measure of school resources –  headteachers may use this in any way they see fit rather than to 
reduce the pupil-teacher ratio. Finally, there is a potentially more serious endogeneity issue when using the 
pupil-teacher ratio as a measure of resources because even if expenditure per pupil can be thought of as 
exogenous (conditional on other controls), how exactly the money is spent may not be. 
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where A denotes the attainment of pupil i in school s at time t; E is average school 
expenditure per pupil (represented as an average of expenditure per pupil over the previous 
three years); X denotes pupil characteristics (including attainment at age 7, in the Key Stage 1 
assessment), Z is a set of school characteristics and ε is an error term. The αt term is a set of 
year dummies, included to capture year on year differences in pupil attainment. We add a full 
set of school fixed effects µ, to control for unobservable school characteristics that are 
constant over time. If this approach is valid, we can expand on it to identify the effect of 
expenditure per pupil on particular sub-groups by including interaction terms between 
expenditure per pupil and some of the pupil characteristics included in X. 
 Estimating equation 1 identifies the true causal impact of expenditure per pupil on 
attainment at the end of Key Stage 2 if all factors that are correlated with both expenditure 
per pupil and attainment are controlled for in the regression. We have improved on previous 
studies using a similar approach because we control for all time-constant school 
characteristics (whether observed or not) and detailed pupil characteristics.
13
 This is 
potentially important here because Local Authorities may distribute funding to schools on the 
basis of school characteristics that are not fully measured in the available data (and these 
characteristics might also influence pupil attainment independently of the effect that they 
have on funding). 
 In the above Section, we have argued that time-varying changes in the way Local 
Authorities have allocated funding to schools (combined with the changes in how funding has 
been allocated to Local Authorities from central government) is a good reason for why we 
might expect (exogenous) variation in school expenditure even after we condition on all these 
school and pupil-level variables. It is crucial for our identification assumption that such 
                                                          
13
 Levăcić et al. (2005) and Jenkins et al. (2006) use this data to conduct a similar analysis for secondary 
schools, although they only use one cohort in their analyses.  
10 
 
variation is not generated by factors that might directly affect educational outcomes other 
than through expenditure.  
 Although we cannot directly prove the identification assumption, we can conduct a 
falsification test wherein we include expenditure inputs that took place when the pupil 
attended primary school and expenditure inputs that took place after the pupil had left 
primary school (which could not possibly influence his/her attainment). Specifically, we 
estimate the following:  
 
Aist = α0 +β1Es,t-2+ β2Es,t-1+ β3Es,t+β4Es,t+1+γXist +δZst + αt + µs + εist                                 (2) 
  
 
In this case, we include expenditure for each year separately (i.e. t-2, two years before the 
pupil undertook the test; t-1, one year before the pupil undertook the test etc.) and also 
include a measure of school expenditure the year after the pupil left primary school (t+1). If 
school expenditure is associated with pupil attainment because of an unobserved variable 
(which has some persistence), then the coefficient on expenditure the year after the pupil left 
primary school may be significantly related to the outcome variable. However, if the 
coefficients on expenditure reflect a causal impact, there can be no possible influence of this 
variable on the outcome variable. While this would not prove our identification assumption, it 
would nonetheless give good reason to interpret the coefficients on expenditure in a causal 
way.
14
  
                                                          
14
 If there were a transitory shock correlated with school expenditure and pupil outcomes, the „falsification test‟ 
would be misleading. However, we think this scenario is unlikely.   
11 
 
 
4. The Effects of Expenditure on Outcomes 
In Table 1 we show OLS estimates of the effect of average expenditure per pupil on various 
test outcomes at age 11: English (columns 1 and 2); Mathematics (columns 3 and 4); Science 
(columns 5 and 6). The outcome variables are the standardized test scores in these subjects.
15
  
In each case, we show 2 columns – one when only average expenditure per pupil and 
year dummies are included and another where the full set of controls are included (i.e. 
equation 1). The more detailed specification involves controlling for everything about the 
school which does not vary over time (between 2001/02 and 2006/07) and many of the 
important pupil characteristics that would be expected to vary for different cohorts (i.e. age 7 
test scores, ethnicity, Free School Meal eligibility, Special Educational Needs status, whether 
English is the first language of the pupil). The contrast between the two columns shows how 
important it is to include detailed controls. In the simple specifications, average expenditure 
per pupil is shown to be strongly negatively associated with pupil outcomes. This reflects the 
fact that school funding is strongly re-distributive. When we include detailed controls, the 
effect of expenditure per pupil on test scores is consistently positive and significant for all 
outcome measures.  The results show that an increase of £1,000 in average expenditure per 
pupil (i.e. an increase of one third – close to the actual increase over the period of our data) 
would raise standardized test scores by 0.045, 0.055 and 0.054 standard deviations in English, 
Mathematics and Science respectively. Thus, in contrast to much of the literature (which 
often finds zero effects), we find good evidence of positive effects of school resources on 
attainment. An important question is whether the benefits are of sufficient magnitude to 
justify the cost involved. We discuss this in the next section. 
                                                          
15
 Scores are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one in each year. 
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As has been discussed above, we cannot directly test the assumption that expenditure 
per pupil is uncorrelated with unobservable variables that are also correlated with pupil 
attainment (even after controlling for a rich set of variables). However, we can comment on 
the plausibility of this assumption by implementing a „falsification test‟. Specifically, we look 
to see whether expenditure the year after the pupil left primary school still has an effect on 
their attainment. The results are shown in Table 2.  In these specifications, rather than 
including 3-year averages for school expenditure, we include expenditure in different periods: 
t (when the pupil was in the final year of primary school) and two years before that ( t-1; t-2). 
The period t+1 refers to the year after the pupil completed his/her test. If we believe that the 
coefficient on expenditure reflects its causal impact on attainment, then we should not see a 
significant relationship between this variable and test scores after the pupil has completed 
his/her test. 
For all subjects, the coefficient on expenditure is positive and significant for all 3 
years in which the pupil is actually in the school and working towards the assessment at age 
11.
16
 However, the coefficient goes to zero after the pupil has completed his/her tests and 
moved to secondary school. This is in line with a causal interpretation for the expenditure 
variable.  
Finally, since the falsification test gives us reason to think that the OLS estimates do 
reveal the average causal effect of expenditure on outcomes, we turn to consider whether 
there is a heterogeneous effect of expenditure. We re-estimate equation (1) including 
interactions between pupil characteristics and the expenditure variable. In Table 3 we report 
results where the expenditure variable has been interacted with whether the pupil is 
                                                          
16
 The rationale for using 3 year averages for expenditure in our baseline regressions is that it is the spending 
over the time the pupil has been at school (rather than spending in a particular year) which is important for 
outcomes. Also using averages helps mitigate problems arising from measurement error. However, it is 
noteworthy that summing the coefficients for the 3 years in which the pupil was in the school gives similar 
estimates to those where average expenditure is used as the relevant variable.  
13 
 
economically disadvantaged (as measured by whether he/she is eligible to receive Free 
School Meals). The results suggest that the average effect of expenditure is higher for such 
pupils. Summing up the effects suggests that for a disadvantaged pupil, the average effect of 
increasing expenditure by £1,000 would be to increase attainment by 0.063, 0.073 and 0.071 
standard deviations in English, Mathematics and Science respectively.  
We have also interacted expenditure with pupil-level ability and whether he/she 
speaks English as a second language (not reported). In the former case, there is no difference 
between high and low ability students (as measured by attainment at age 7) in the effect of 
expenditure on age 11 tests. In the latter case, there is a slightly higher impact for those who 
speak English as an additional language.  
 
5. Cost-Effectiveness 
If we take the OLS results as reasonable baseline estimates of the effect of pupil expenditure 
on test score outcomes, the next question to ask is whether the magnitude of effects is large 
given the cost. In other words, has the increase in school expenditure been cost-effective? 
This is a difficult question to answer because much depends on the consequences of 
improving these attainment measures for later outcomes.  
 We can compare effects estimated here to those estimated in international studies. For 
example, Krueger and Whitmore (2001) found a class size reduction in the STAR program to 
lead to an increase in test scores of 0.13 standard deviations. Costs are estimated at around 
half of total per pupil expenditure ($7502 at the time). This compares to our effects of about 
0.05 standard deviations for about one third of per pupil expenditure (£1,000). In another 
study, Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain (2002) suggest that having a teacher at the higher end of 
the quality distribution raises student achievement by at least 0.11 standard deviations. 
However, it is difficult to know what it costs to improve „teacher quality‟. 
14 
 
 Machin and McNally (2008) estimate the effectiveness of the „literacy hour‟ in the 
late 1990s.
17
 They find that this policy initiative raised reading scores by between 0.06 and 
0.09 standard deviations at a very low cost. They produce a back-of-envelope estimate of the 
benefits such an increase in reading scores might produce in wages over the lifecycle (using 
the British Cohort Survey – those born in 1970 who are observed in the labour market at age 
30). They estimate benefits of between £1375 and £3581 for an increase in the reading score 
by 0.06 standard deviations. Since we estimate an increase in pupil expenditure to lead to an 
increase in the English score of 0.05 standard deviations, the back-of-envelope calculation 
can also be applied in this context. On this basis, we would argue that the increase in school 
expenditure probably has been cost-effective. Moreover, this estimated wage benefit does not 
capture the expected returns from improved numeracy skills, nor any non-wage benefits of 
learning.  
 Finally, increasing parental choice and promoting competition between schools have 
been important components of government policy since the 1980s. It is noteworthy that using 
the same data set, Gibbons et al. (2008) find little evidence of a link between choice and 
competition and performance in English primary schools. Taken together with our results, 
this suggests that more traditional resource-based policies have been more successful for 
raising educational standards in English primary schools.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Whether increasing school resources has an effect on educational outcomes has been long-
debated and hotly contested. The answer to this question is extremely policy-relevant because 
increasing (or reducing) school expenditure is one of the key levers open to policy makers to 
                                                          
17
 They evaluate the pilot, before the policy was rolled out nationally in 1998/1999. The „literacy hour‟ involved 
a daily hour of teaching English. It provided a much more rigid and structured form on the curriculum for 
English teaching than what was previously in place. 
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try to influence educational standards. In the UK, there has been a dramatic increase in the 
level of school expenditure per pupil, after many years of stagnation. Using much better data 
than usually available to researchers (including school-level expenditure data and detailed 
pupil-level attainment data), we have been able to consider the question of whether this rise 
in expenditure has improved educational outcomes over the relevant time period.  
 The fact that there has been so much (regulatory-inspired) change to funding formulae 
suggests that there has been (exogenous) variation in school expenditure even after one 
conditions on school and pupil characteristics. We conduct a falsification test that supports 
the argument that our estimate of the effect of school expenditure on pupil outcomes reflects 
a causal impact. We find that school expenditure has a consistently positive and significant 
effect on all national tests taken at the end of primary school and has a higher effect for 
students who are economically disadvantaged. Thus, in contrast to much of the literature, we 
find evidence that a general rise in school expenditure can raise educational standards. Our 
analysis suggests that the English policy of increasing school spending over the past few 
years has been worth the investment. 
 
16 
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Figure 1
School Expenditure in England, Real terms
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
19
92
/9
3
19
94
/9
5
19
96
/9
7
19
98
/9
9
20
00
/0
1
20
02
/0
3
20
04
/0
5
20
06
/0
7
Year
E
x
p
en
d
it
u
re
 p
er
 p
u
p
il Local Authority maintained
pre-primary and primary
schools
Local Authority maintained
primary schools
Local Authority maintained
secondary schools
 18 
Figure 2
Distribution of schools' expenditure per pupil (25th to 75th percentile) in 
2002 and 2007 among schools with different degrees of deprivation as 
defined by FSM
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Table 1 
Effects of average expenditure per pupil on Key Stage 2 attainment (national tests at age 11) 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Point score English Point score Maths Point score Science 
       
Avg. exp/pup -0.259 0.045 -0.251 0.055 -0.280 0.054 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) 
       
       
Observations 3411903 3411903 3411321 3411321 3415527 3415527 
Nr of schools 15329 15329 15329 15329 15329 15329 
R-squared 0.02 0.65 0.02 0.63 0.02 0.53 
       
       
Year dummies x X x x x x 
School dummies, 
individual controls 
 X  x  x 
       
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; clustered on schools. 
Data for KS2 cohorts 2002-2007. 
Average expenditure per pupil (over the last three years before KS2 tests) is expressed in thousands of pounds, 
2007 prices. 
Individual controls include: gender, ethnicity, whether English is a first language (EFL), whether the pupil is 
known to be eligible for Free School Meals (FSM), Special Educational Needs status (with and without 
statement), KS1 attainment in Reading, Writing and Maths, and percentage of pupils eligible for free school 
meals and pupil numbers at school. 
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Table 2 
The effect of expenditure per pupil in individual years on Key Stage 2 attainment 
-Including future years as a falsification test 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Point score English Point score Maths Point score Science 
    
Exp/pup t-2 0.022 0.020 0.013 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Exp/pup t-1 0.012 0.014 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Exp/pup 0.023 0.018 0.029 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Exp/pup t+1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
    
Observations 2828846 2828272 2831877 
Number of schools 15049 15049 15049 
R-squared 0.65 0.64 0.53 
    
Year dummies, school 
dummies, individual 
controls 
x x x 
    
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; clustered on schools. 
Data for KS2 cohorts 2002-2006. 
Expenditure per pupil is expressed in thousands of pounds, 2007 prices. 
Individual controls include: gender, ethnicity, whether English is a first language (EFL), whether the pupil is 
known to be eligible for Free School Meals (FSM), Special Educational Needs status (with and without 
statement), KS1 attainment in Reading, Writing and Maths, and percentage of pupils eligible for free school 
meals and pupil numbers at school. 
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Table 3 
The effect of average expenditure per pupil on Key Stage 2 attainment  
interacted with pupil’s Free School Meals (FSM) eligibility status 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Point score English Point score Maths Point score Science 
    
Avg. exp/pup 0.036 0.045 0.046 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Avg. exp/pup x FSM eligible 0.027 0.027 0.025 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
    
Observations 3411903 3411321 3415527 
Number of schools 15329 15329 15329 
R-squared 0.65 0.63 0.53 
    
Year dummies, school dummies, 
individual controls 
X x x 
    
Notes: See Table 1 
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Appendix Table 1 
Expenditure per pupil for different spending categories 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 
Expenditure per pupil (Std. Dev) 
Source: Section 52 
Weighted by KS2 pupils as in the pupil-level dataset 
      
2,539    (471) 2,866  (585) 3,046   (603) 3,132   (587) 3,332   (642) 3,436   (687) 
      
Spending category shares 
Source: CFR 
Weighted by KS2 pupils as in the pupil-level dataset 
      
Teachers      
N.A. 61.2% 61.8% 60.3% 58.8% N.A. 
      
Support staff 
N.A. 9.9% 10.7% 11.5% 12.5% N.A. 
      
Other staff      
N.A. 8.6% 8.5% 8.6% 8.7% N.A. 
      
Building, maintenance 
N.A. 6.6% 6.2% 6.2% 6.4% N.A. 
      
Learning/IT 
N.A. 5.5% 5.2% 5.4% 5.4% N.A. 
      
Other      
N.A. 8.1% 7.6% 7.9% 8.1% N.A. 
      
Notes: Expenditure per pupil refers to real expenditure in 2007 prices. 
Expenditure categories correspond to the following CFR classifications: Teachers (E01-E02, E26), Support staff 
(E03), Other staff (E04-E08), Building/maintenance (E12-E18), Learning/IT (E19-E20), Other (E09-E11, E21-
E25, E27-E30). 
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Appendix Table 2 
Summary statistics 
Pupil-level dataset, KS2 cohorts 2002-2007 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
    
Standardized score English 0.00 1.00 3411903 
Standardized score Maths 0.00 1.00 3411321 
Standardized score Science 0.00 1.00 3415527 
(Exp/pup)/1000 – 3-year average 2.85 0.61 3452888 
(Exp/pup)/1000 – no average 3.05 0.67 3452888 
Male 0.51 0.50 3452888 
Eligible for free school meal  0.17 0.37 3452888 
Spec. edu. needs without statement 0.20 0.40 3452888 
Spec. edu. needs with statement 0.02 0.15 3452888 
English as first language 0.90 0.30 3452888 
White 0.83 0.37 3452888 
Black 0.04 0.19 3452888 
Bangladeshi 0.01 0.10 3452888 
Indian 0.02 0.15 3452888 
Pakistani 0.02 0.15 3452888 
Asian_other 0.01 0.11 3452888 
Chinese 0.00 0.06 3452888 
Mixed 0.02 0.16 3452888 
Other ethnicity 0.01 0.11 3452888 
Ethnicity unknown 0.01 0.10 3452888 
Ethnicity refused 0.01 0.11 3452888 
KS1 reading – no level achieved 0.02 0.15 3452888 
KS1 reading level 1 0.13 0.34 3452888 
KS1 reading level 2A 0.18 0.38 3452888 
KS1 reading level 2B 0.20 0.40 3452888 
KS1 reading level 2C 0.16 0.36 3452888 
KS1 reading level 3 0.27 0.44 3452888 
KS1 reading level 4 0.00 0.03 3452888 
KS1 writing no level achieved 0.04 0.20 3452888 
KS1 writing level 1 0.10 0.30 3452888 
KS1 writing level 2A 0.18 0.38 3452888 
KS1 writing level 2B 0.28 0.45 3452888 
KS1 writing level 2C 0.27 0.44 3452888 
KS1 writing level 3 0.09 0.29 3452888 
KS1 writing level 4 0.00 0.02 3452888 
KS1 maths no level achieved 0.02 0.12 3452888 
KS1 maths level 1 0.08 0.27 3452888 
KS1 maths level 2A 0.22 0.42 3452888 
KS1 maths level 2B 0.21 0.41 3452888 
KS1 maths level 2C 0.18 0.38 3452888 
KS1 maths level 3 0.24 0.43 3452888 
KS1 maths level 4 0.00 0.02 3452888 
Pct eligible for Free School Meals (3 year avg. at school) 16.55 14.41 3452888 
Log total pupils (3 year avg. at school) 5.68 0.48 3452888 
    
 
